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The Right to Life of the Unborn-An 
Assessment of the Eighth Amendment to the 
Irish Constitution 
The late President of Ireland and former Chief Justice of 
the Irish Supreme Court, Cearbhall O'Dalaigh, once stated, 
"Constitutional rights are declared not alone because of bitter 
memories of the past but no less because of the improbable, but 
not-to-be-overlooked, perils of the future."' This statement de- 
scribes the rationale behind the eighth amendment to the Irish 
Constitution. Viewed in popular terms as a prolife amendment, 
its genesis lies in fear that the almost universal trend to liber- 
alize abortion legislation may creep into Ireland. The amend- 
ment attempts to strike the appropriate balance between the 
mother's constitutionally protected personal rights and the un- 
born's right to life. Although it was strongly supported by the 
people, the amendment contains some technical problems, as 
well as some broad language that may permit rather than pre- 
vent the introduction of abortion legislation in Ireland. How- 
ever, in light of the strong public opinion against any liberaliza- 
tion of abortion laws, and the legislative and judicial 
development of Irish family law, the more realistic view is that 
the amendment is a powerful endorsement of Ireland's prolife 
position. 
In order to understand the legal and political atmosphere in 
Ireland a t  the time the amendment was passed, it is necessary to 
understand (1) the historical development of the Irish Republic, 
(2) the effects of foreign legislation on Irish law, and (3) the de- 
velopment of Irish abortion law. 
Because English rule was imposed for several centuries, En- 
glish common law directly applied -in Ireland.2 Abortion was 
viewed by early English commentators as a serious crime. Black- 
stone stated: 
1. McMahon v. Attorney Gen., 1972 Ir. R. 69, 111. 
2. Henchy, Precedent in the Irish Supreme Court, 25 MOD. L. Rev. 544 (1962). 
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Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in 
every individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon 
as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb. For if a wo- 
man is quick with child, and by a potion or otherwise, killeth it 
in her womb; or if anyone beat her, whereby the child dieth in 
her body, and she is delivered of a dead child; this, though not 
murder, was by the ancient law homicide or manslaughter. But 
the modern law doth not look upon this offence in quite so 
atrocious a light, but merely as a heinous mi~demeanor.~ 
Ireland was incorporated into the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland in 1800 by the Union with Ireland Act.4 The 
English Parliament became the sole legislator for both England 
and Ireland and thereafter all enactments specifically stated 
whether they were to apply to England, Ireland, or both.6 
In the nineteenth century, the English Parliament codified 
the law governing abortion in the Offences Against the Person 
The Act specifically declared that it applied to Ireland.7 
Sections 58 and 59 provided: 
58. Every Woman, being with Child, who with Intent to pro- 
cure her own Miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to 
herself any Poison or other noxious Thing, or shall unlaw- 
fully use any Instrument or other Means whatsoever with 
the like Intent, and whosoever, with Intent to procure the 
Miscarriage of any Woman, whether she be or be not with 
Child, shall unlawfully administer to her or cause to be 
taken by her any Poison or other noxious Thing, or shall 
unlawfully use any Instrument or other Means whatso- 
ever with the like Intent, shall be guilty of Felony, and 
being convicted thereof shall be liable, a t  the Discretion 
of the Court, to be kept in Penal Servitude for Life or for 
any Term not less than Three Years, or to be imprisoned 
3. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 129-30 (4th ed. 1771); see also E. COKE, THIRD 
INSTITUTE 50 (1979) (1st ed. London 1628). 
4. 39 & 40 Geo. 3, ch. 67 (1800), reprinted in 23 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 
832 (A. Yonge 3d ed. 1970). The union was codified by an identical Irish act, the Act of 
Union (Ireland) 1800. The Act abolished the separate Irish Parliament that had existed 
since the thirteenth century. The Act received the Royal Assent on August 1, 1800. 
5. For example, The Abortion Act, 1967, ch. 87, 5 7(3) specifically provides that it 
does not apply to Northern Ireland. 
6. 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 100 (1861). 
7. Id. The preamble to the Act states, "Whereas it is expedient to consolidate and 
amend the Statute Law of England and Ireland in relation to offences against the person 
. . ." (emphasis in original). 
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for any Term not exceeding Two Years, with or without 
Hard Labour, and with or without Solitary Confinement. 
59. Whosoever shall unlawfully supply or procure any Poison 
or other noxious Thing, or any Instrument or Thing 
whatsoever, knowing that the same is intended to be un- 
lawfully used or employed with Intent to procure the 
Miscarriage of any Woman, whether she be or be not with 
Child, shall be guilty of a Misdemeanor, and being con- 
victed thereof shall be liable, a t  the Discretion of the 
Court, to be kept in Penal Servitude for the Term of 
Three Years, or to be imprisoned for any Term not ex- 
ceeding Two Years, with or without Hard Labour. 
This Act continues to be the law concerning abortion in Ireland 
today.8 
In 1921 a treaty was signed between Ireland and England 
forming the Irish Free State (Saorstat Eireann) out of twenty- 
six of the thirty-two Irish counties.' Although it remained a 
member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Irish Free 
State ceased to be part of the United Kingdom. In 1922 an Irish 
Constitution was established.1•‹ This constitution was amended 
twenty-seven times in the next fifteen years" and was finally 
superceded in 1937 when the present constitution was approved 
by plebiscite. The eighth amendment discussed in this comment 
has been incoporated into the 1937 con~titution.'~ 
The 1937 constitution virtually severed Ireland's ties to 
Great Britain.13 However, i t  provided (as did the 1922 constitu- 
tion) that all laws previously in force would continue to be of 
full force and effect so long as they were consistent with the 
1937 constitution, or until they were repealed or amended by the 
Oireachtas (Irish Parliament).14 Thus, the "unlawful miscar- 
8. Binchy, Abortion and the Law, in ABORTION OW 69 (1983) (published by Life 
Education and Research Network). 
9. Codified in The Irish Free State (Agreement) Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, ch. 4, 
reprinted in 4 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 636 (A. Yonge 3d ed. 1968). The re- 
maining six counties now constitute Northern Ireland and remain under English rule. 
10. Codified in The Irish Free State (Saorstat Eireann) Constitution Act, 1922, 13 
Geo. 5, ch. 1, reprinted in 4 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 641 (A. Yonge 3d ed. 
1968). 
11. 4 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 642 (A. Yonge 3d ed. 1968). 
12. IRISH CONST. art. 40.3.3. 
13. The final step occurred in 1948 when the Irish Free State left the British Com- 
monwealth of Nations. I t  is now internationally recognized as the Republic of Ireland. 
See The Ireland Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 41, reprinted in 4 HALSBURY'S STAT- 
UTES OF ENGLAND 670 (A. Yonge 3d ed. 1968). 
14. IRISH CONST. art. 50.1. 
374 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I984 
riages" provisions of the Offences Against the Person Act were 
carried over into Irish law by the new constitution. 
Although sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act specifically prohibit abortion in Ireland, there have 
been few  prosecution^.'^ In 1945 William Henry Coleman was 
charged with two counts of attempting to perform an abortion.I6 
He was found guilty and sentenced to fifteen years of penal ser- 
vitude on each count with the sentences to run concurrently. 
The most infamous Irish abortionist was a woman known as 
Nurse Cadden, who "was a well known figure . . . on the Dublin 
scene for 20 years."17 Her medical services came to an end in 
1956, when she was convicted of murder after the body of a wo- 
man, who died following an abortion, was found on the public 
footpath outside her apartment.ls Nurse Cadden was sentenced 
to death, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. 
In neither of these cases, nor in any other case to date, has 
an Irish court analyzed the scope of sections 58 and 59." How- 
ever, the English courts have analyzed these sections and an ex- 
amination of their analysis is instructive because of its poten- 
tially persuasive influence on Irish law. 
The most pertinent case is Rex v. Bourne.20 Dr. Aleck 
Bourne, a respected obstetrician, performed an abortion on a 
fourteen-year-old girl who had been violently raped. Dr. Bourne 
stated that he felt he had a duty to perform the abortion after 
deciding that continuance of the pregnancy would probably 
cause her serious injury.21 Justice MacNaghten, in his instruc- 
tions to the jury, stated that since sections 58 and 59 used the 
word "unlawfully" in relation to procuring a miscarriage, i t  im- 
plied that procuring a miscarriage would not be "unlawful" in 
certain circumstances. In defining these circumstances he bor- 
rowed language from the Infant Life (Preservation) Act of 
15. P. JACKSON. THE DEADLY SOLUTION TO AN IRISH PROBLEM-BACKSTREET ABORTION 
2 (1983) (published by the Women's Right To Choose Campaign). Jackson suggested 
that there have been 58 illegal abortion cases investigated or tried in Ireland between 
1926 and 1974. 
16. People v. Coleman, 1945 Ir. R. 237 (Crim. App. 1944) (the conviction was later 
reversed on other grounds). 
17. P. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 4. 
18. Id. at 5. 
19. Binchy, Ethical Issues in Reproductive Medicine: A Legal Perspective, in ETHI- 
CAL ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE M DICINE 95, 102 (M. Reidy ed. 1982). 
20. [I9391 1 K.B. 687. 
21. Id. at 688. 
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1929,22 which provided that the killing of a child capable of be- 
ing born alive was not an offense if the act was done "in good 
faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother."23 
Though sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person 
Act did not provide such an exception, Justice MacNaghten in- 
terpreted the Act as though it did. He added that this standard 
ought to be given a reasonable interpretation: 
[I]f the doctor is of opinion, on reasonable grounds and with 
adequate knowledge, that the probable consequence of the con- 
tinuance of the pregnancy will be to make the woman a physi- 
cal or mental wreck, the jury are [sic] quite entitled to take the 
view that the doctor who, under those circumstances and in 
that honest belief, operates, is operating for the purpose of pre- 
serving the life of the mother.=' 
Based on this sweeping instruction, the jury acquitted Dr. 
Bourne.26 
The impact of Bourne on Irish law is unclear. I t  is not bind- 
ing precedent and opinions vary about its persuasive value. Wil- 
liam Binchy, a member of the Irish Law Reform Commission, 
and an authority on Irish family law stated: 
I t  will be recalled that that decision [Bourne] held that neces- 
sity was a defence to a prosecution for abortion, and that an 
abortion performed to save the life of the mother would thus 
be permissible. It seems that this part of the judgment would 
represent the law in this country. But where that judgment 
went on to hold that an abortion would be lawful if designed to 
save the mother from becoming a "physical or mental wreck", 
this would surely not represent our law, since i t  goes far be- 
yond what the defence of necessity can e n c o m p a s ~ . ~ ~  
On the other hand, Father Bernard Treacy, a staunch anti-abor- 
tion campaigner noted: 
However, the judge did state that the words "for the pur- 
pose only of preserving the life of the mother" represented the 
common law, and thus were implicit in the 1861 Act by virtue 
of the word "unlawfully". 
If these words do represent the pre-1861 common law, i t  
22. 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 34, reprinted in 8 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 304 (A. 
Yonge 3d ed. 1969). 
23. Infant Life (Preservation) Act of 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 34, 5 l(1). 
24. [I9391 1 K.B. at 694. 
25. Id. at 696. 
26. Binchy, supra note 19, at 103. 
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could be argued that they thereby declare the position in Irish 
law. If so, an Irish court could validly adopt the view that pro- 
curing a miscarriage would not be "unlawful" in regard to Sec- 
tion 58 of The Offences Against the Person Act if it were pro- 
cured in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life 
of the mother. However, the doctrine in [sic] unclear; and,clari- 
fication would be welcome.27 
However, it is clear that Bourne opened the door to the lib- 
eralization of abortion laws in England. In 1967, in response to 
the thalidomide tragedy of the early 1960~,~ '  the English Parlia- 
ment, with the encouragement of the Abortion Law Reform As- 
sociation, passed The Abortion Act.29 The Act provided: 
l(1) . . . [A] person shall not be guilty of an offence under the 
law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated 
by a registered medical practitioner if two registered 
medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good 
faith- 
(a) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve 
risk to the life of the pregnant woman, or of injury 
to the physical or mental health of the pregnant wo- 
man or any existing children of her family, greater 
than if the pregnancy were terminated; or 
(b) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were 
born it would suffer from such physical or mental 
abnormalities as to be seriously handi~apped.~' 
The Abortion Act did not overrule sections 58 and 59 of the 
Offences Against the Person Act; however, it significantly nar- 
rowed the definition of what an unlawful abortion entailed.31 
Furthermore, although the Abortion Act, as an act of the British 
Parliament, has no legally binding effect in Ireland, it has had a 
significant impact in that an increasing number of Irish women 
27. Treacy, The Constitution and Right to Life, in ABORTION AND LAW 74, 80 (A. 
Flannery ed. 1983). 
28. For a complete account of the Abortion Law Reform Association and the impact 
of the thalidomide tragedy on the movement to reform abortion law in England, see K. 
HINDELL & M. SIMMS. ABORTION LAW REFORMED 108 (1971). 
29. 1967, ch. 87. 
30. Id. •˜ l( l)(a)-(b).  
31. Effectively, abortion is now available on demand in England. Official statistics 
indicate that in the last three months of 1983 there were 37,628 abortions performed. 
OFFICE OF POPULATION CENSUSES & SURVEYS, OPCS MONITOR (August 7, 1984). 
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are now having safe, lawful, and relatively inexpensive abortions 
in English clinics.32 
A modern trend toward liberalization of abortion laws in 
western democracieP caused conservative Irish lawyers and 
doctors to be concerned that the Irish abortion laws might be 
subject to change. Much of this concern was due to the fact that 
the Irish Constitution provided no explicit protection for the un- 
born child. Article 40.3 provides: 
(1) The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and as far as 
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the per- 
sonal rights of the citizen. 
(2) The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best 
it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice 
done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and property 
rights of every ~it izen.~'  
However, these provisions only apply to "citizens." The consti- 
tution provides that citizenship is "determined in accordance 
with law."s6 The law defining citizenship is contained in the 
Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act and provides: 
(1) Every person born in Ireland is an Irish citizen from 
birth. 
(2) Every person is an Irish citizen if his father or mother 
was an Irish citizen a t  the time of that person's birth or 
becomes an Irish citizen under subsection (1) or would be 
an Irish cit izen under that subsection if alive a t  the pass- 
ing of this 
Although it is clear from this language that an unborn child is 
not a citizen, the Irish Supreme Court in State (Nicolaou) u. An 
Bord U ~ h t a l a ~ ~  left open the possibility of affording constitu- 
tional protection for a noncitizen. Nicolaou, a British subject, 
32. In 1968 fewer than 100 Irish women had abortions in English clinics, whereas by 
the end of 1981, the number had risen to almost 4,000. MEDICO-SOCIAL RESEARCH BOARD, 
TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY, ENGLAND 1983, WOMEN FROM THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 9 
(1984) (citing MEDICO-SOCIAL RESEARCH BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 49 (1982)). 
33. Abortion was legalized in England in 1967, the United States in 1973, France in 
1975, Germany in 1976, Italy in 1978, and Holland in 1981. 340 DAIL DEB. 1585 (1983). 
34. IRISH CONST. arts. 40.3.1 & 40.3.2. 
35. Id. art. 9.1.2. 
36. PUB. GEN. ACTS, no. 26, 55 6(1) & (2) (1956). 
37. 1966 1r. R. 567. 
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sought a court order to prevent the adoption of his illegitimate 
son. He claimed that the Adoption Act was unconstitutional be- 
cause it violated his rights as a natural father. The court stated: 
"This Court expressly reserves for another and more appropriate 
case consideration of the effect of non-citzenship upon the inter- 
pretation of the Articles in question . . . ."38 Even if Article 40.3 
were interpreted to apply to noncitizens, it would take quite a 
liberal interpretation of the word "citizen" to encompass the un- 
born 
The parameters of the constitutional rights of the unborn 
became less clear following decisions of the Irish Supreme Court 
that provided constitutional protection of individual personal 
rights that were not explicitly granted in the constitution. This 
trend began in 1963 with Ryan v. Attorney GeneraL40 Mrs. 
Ryan sought to have the Health (Floridation of Water Supplies) 
Act struck down as uncon~titutional.~~ The supreme court af- 
firmed the high court's decision that, based on the facts, Mrs. 
Ryan's suit could not succeed. However, the court confirmed 
that the right to bodily integrity was included as part of the gen- 
eral constitutionally guaranteed personal rights.42 Quoting Jus- 
tice Kenny of the high court, the supreme court held that "the 
personal rights which may be invoked to invalidate legislation 
are not confined to those specified in Article 40 but include all 
38. Id. a t  645. 
39. Heuston, Personal Rights under the Irish Constitution, 11 IRISH JURIST 205, 213 
(1976), reprinted in 11 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 294, 304 (1977), stated in this regard: 
The phrase "of the citizen" has given rise to difficulties here and elsewhere 
throughout the fundamental rights Articles. At least two questions arise-first, 
whether the constitutional guarantees extend to aliens and secondly, whether 
they extend to artificial as distinct from natural persons. The Supreme Court 
seems to be uncertain whether the constitutional guarantees protect aliens, al- 
though in one case on the matter (In Re Singer) [97 I.L.T.R. 130 (1960)l in 
which the issue might have arisen, counsel for the State expressly disclaimed 
any reliance on it. Clearly it would be very embarrassing for the Court, espe- 
cially since the State has joined the European Economic Community, to be 
obliged to hold that an alien was not entitled to the same degree of protection 
as a citizen. On the other hand, simply as a matter of the interpretation of 
words, it is very difficult to see how the word "citizen" can be held to mean 
"any person whether a citizen or an alien." 
40. 1965 Ir. R. 294. 
41. The Health Act authorized the adding of flouride to public water in order to 
protect against dental decay. Mrs. Ryan challenged the state action as an infringement 
of (1) her parental rights to raise her children, and (2) her individual rights to personal 
integrity. Id. a t  341. 
42. Id. a t  295. 
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those rights that flow from the Christian and democratic nature 
of the State."43 
The court soon recognized other personal most no- 
tably the right of marital privacy recognized in the 1973 
landmark decision of McGee u. Attorney General.45 In three 
years Mrs. McGee bore four children, two of them twins. Mrs. 
McGee had a long history of medical problems and each of her 
pregnancies had been difficult; she nearly lost her life while 
pregnant with her second child. Her doctor advised her that an- 
other pregnancy would endanger her life, so she was fitted with a 
diaphragm to be used with an intrauterine contraceptive jelly.46 
She brought this action after a supply of contraceptive jelly she 
was attempting to import from England was seized by customs 
officials pursuant to the Criminal Law Amendment Act.47 
Strangely, the Act prohibited the importation and sale of con- 
traceptives, but not their use.48 By a four-to-one majority, the 
supreme court held that the importation restriction was a viola- 
tion of the right to marital privacy provided by articles 40.3.1 
and 41.1 of the Irish Cons t i t u t i~n .~~  
Those opposed to abortion were not so much concerned by 
the narrow holding of McGee as they were by the cases the court 
cited as support for the decision. The court relied extensively on 
two United States Supreme Court decisions, Griswold u. Con- 
necticutS0 and Eisenstadt u. B ~ i r d . ~ l  In Griswold, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the right of married persons to 
use contraceptives was part of the constitutionally protected 
right of marital Eisenstadt extended that right to the 
43. Id. a t  312. 
44. See State (Healy) v. Donoghue, 1976 Ir. R. 325 (the right to justice and fair 
procedure); Murtagh Properties v. Cleary, 1972 Ir. R. 330 (the right to work & earn a 
livelihood); I n  re Haughey, 1971 Ir. R. 217 (the right to defend one's name). 
45. 1974 Ir. R. 284. 
46. Id. 
47. PUB. GEN. ACTS, no. 6 (1935). 
48. Id. $ 17(1) provides, "It shall not be lawful for any person to sell, or expose, 
offer, advertise, or keep for sale or to import or attempt to import into Saorstat Eireann 
for sale, any contraceptive." 
49. 1974 Ir. R. a t  284-85. IRISH CONST. art. 40.3.1 states, "The State guarantees in its 
laws to respect, and as far as practicable, by its law to defend and vindicate the personal 
rights of the citizen." Article 41.1.1 states, "The state recognizes the family as the natu- 
ral, primary and fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution possess- 
ing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law." 
50. 381 US.  479 (1965). 
51. 405 US.  438 (1972). 
52. 381 US.  a t  484-86. 
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unmarried,53 and was the stepping-stone from Griswold to one of 
the major United States abortion decisions, Roe v. Wade.54 In 
Roe, the United States Supreme Court held that the word "per- 
son", as used in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, did not include the unborn child.55 The United 
States Supreme Court also held that the constitutionally pro- 
tected right to privacy was "broad enough to encompass a wo- 
man's decision whether or not to terminate her p regnan~y ."~~  
The American cases disturbed conservative Irish lawyers67 
and doctors because of the similarity of the equal protection 
clauses of the United States and Irish  constitution^.^^ I t  was 
feared that McGee would lead to the liberalization of abortion 
laws in Ireland, particularly since the Irish Supreme Court looks 
upon the decisions of the United States Supreme Court with the 
greatest of respect.69 
I t  is questionable whether these concerns were justified. 
Justice Walsh, speaking for the court in McGee, addressed the 
abortion issue in somewhat veiled terms: "[Alny action on the 
53. 405 U.S. a t  453-54. 
54. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For an interesting look at  how Justice Brennan prompted 
Justice Blackmun with a reference to Eisenstadt to assist him in bridging the gap from 
Griswold to Roe see B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG. THE BRETHREN 175-76 (1979). 
55. 410 U.S. a t  157. 
56. Id. a t  153. 
57. THE IRISH ASSOCIATION F LAWYERS FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE UNBORN. EWSLET- 
TER 2 (1983) stated, "The great abortion debate in America grew around the word 'per- 
son' and whether or not the word 'person' extended to include the unborn child. The 
similarity to our own situtation is disturbing." 
58. IRISH CONST. art. 40.1 provides, "All citizens shall, as human persons, be held 
before the law. This shall not be held to mean that the state shall not in its enactments 
have due regard to differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social function." 
59. In O'Brien v. Stoutt, No. 326413 (High Ct. May 5, 1982), Justice D'Arcy said that 
"decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States will always be received by this 
Court with the greatest of respect." See Binchy, The Need for a Constitutional Amend- 
ment, in ABORTION & LAW 116, 121, n.16 (A. Flannery ed. 1983); see also State (Quinn) v. 
Ryan, 1965 Ir. R. 70. Justice Walsh stated: 
I reject the submission that because upon the foundation of the State our 
Courts took over an English legal system and the common law that the Courts 
must be deemed to have adopted and should now adopt an approach to Consti- 
tutional questions conditioned by English judicial methods and English legal 
training which despite their undoubted excellence were not fashioned for inter- 
preting written constitutions or reviewing the constitutionality of legislation. 
In this state one would have expected that if the approach of any Court of final 
appeal of another State was to have been held up as an example for this Court 
to follow it would more appropriately have been the Supreme Court of the 
United States rather than the House of Lords. 
Id. a t  126. 
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part of either husband and wife or of the State to limit family 
sizes by endangering or destroying human life must necessarily 
not only be an offence against the common good but also against 
the guaranteed personal rights of that human life in q u e s t i ~ n . " ~ ~  
McGee was decided eleven months after Roe, and Justice Walsh, 
presumably aware of this major decisionY6' appeared to stress 
that McGee was a narrow decision that selectively recognized 
the right of married couples to use contraceptives and it was not 
to be interpreted as anything more. Six years later, Justice 
Walsh was even more explicit in G. u. An Bord U c h t a l ~ : ~ ~  
[A child] has the right to life itself and the right to be guarded 
against all threats directed to its existence whether before or 
after birth. . . . The right to life necessarily implies the right to 
be born, the right to preserve and defend (and to have pre- 
served and defended) that life . . . .63 
Despite these dicta the potential effect of McGee on Irish 
abortion law remains open to debate.64 Professor James Casey of 
University College Dublin Law School stated, "Those who argue 
that since the matrimonial privacy of Griswold u. Connecticut 
60. 1974 Ir. R. a t  312. 
61. Surprisingly, one leading commentator has suggested that the Irish Supreme 
Court was unaware of the Roe decision. W. Binchy, Sexual Behavior and the Law in 
Ireland 22 n.70 (1978) (unpublished manuscript). This seems inconsistent with the pub- 
licity surrounding Roe and the deference given by the Irish Supreme Court to United 
States Supreme Court decisions. See supra note 59. 
62. 1980 Ir. R. 32. 
63. Id. a t  69. 
64. Proponents of the prolife amendment have rejected the persuasive value of these 
dicta: 
Whilst these views expressed by the learned judge are encouraging they do not 
in themselves, of course, afford any adequate legal Constitutional protection 
for the unborn. The other judges in these decisions made it clear that they 
were not expressing any view on this issue. Obiter dicta bind no judge in any 
subsequent decision, not even the judge who made them originally. Mr. Justice 
Walsh would be the first to acknowledge that his view could not bind the 
Court in a future decision: as he pointed out in McGee's case, constitutional 
interpretation is not rooted in the past but is a continuous process through 
time. 
THE IRISH ASSOCIATION F LAWYERS FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE UNBORN, NEWSLETTER 2 
(1983). Professor Kelly, a constitutional law professor and member of the Irish Parlia- 
ment, thinks otherwise. 
Obiter dicta in cases of this importance are not lightly uttered, they are re- 
garded as the next best thing to a binding authority and are freely cited in 
court by counsel. They are treated for all practical purposes as though they 
were authority, even though they do not have a status in the ordinary 
heirarchy of binding precedent that we respect here. 
339 DAIL DEB. 1399 (1983). 
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led to the proabortion decision in Roe u. Wade, the same must 
follow here from McGee u. A.G. are guilty of an absurdly 
mechanical view of the judicial process."6s Professor James 
O'Reilly, another professor of law at  University College Dublin 
Law School, was even more assertive in declaring, "One wonders 
if the commentators who regard the finding of a right to abor- 
tion lurking behind McGee have actually read that decision and 
noticed not only the small print but the implications of the 
small print."" Referring to such people as "prophets of doom," 
he concluded, "Any commentator who seriously suggests that 
one can expect the Irish Supreme Court to arrive at  a situation 
similar to Roe u. Wade or Doe u. Bolton simply has not read the 
Irish Constitution, the judgment in McGee, nor understands all 
the issues involved."67 
Professor Binchy, a key figure in the movement for a prolife 
amendment, saw it otherwise: 
In my view, these commentators are guilty of too much vigour 
in ridiculing the possible developments in this country. No one 
seriously suggests that our Supreme Court would tomorrow 
recognise a constitutional right to abortion. Equally clearly, 
however, attitudes among the judiciary towards abortion may 
change in the coming years. If this happens, the introduction 
by McGee of the privacy concept into our jurisprudence may 
well serve to assist the constitutional case for abortion. With- 
out such a concept, the constitutional argument in favour of 
abortion would be that much more difficult to e~tablish.~' 
Additionally, there were concerns among staunch anti-abortion- 
ists that Ireland, as a signator and contracting party to the Eu- 
ropean Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free- 
doms, might be obligated to modify its laws in relation to 
abortion. This could happen if article two of the Convention, 
which states that "[e]veryone's right to life shall be protected by 
law,"6s were interpreted by the European Commission on 
Human Rights as giving women a limited right to abortion. 
65. Casey, The Development of Constitutional Law Under Chief Justice O'Dalaigh, 
1978 DUBLIN U.L.J. 3, 10. 
66. O'Reilly, Marital Privacy & Family Law, 65 STUDIES 8, 17 (1977). 
67. Id. at 22. 
68. Binchy, supra note 19, at 104. 
69. CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION F HUMAN RIGHTS AND PERSONAL FREEDOMS, 
art. 2(1) [hereinafter cited as CONVENTION], reprinted in J. FAWCETT. HE APPLICATION F 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION  HUMAN RIGHTS 29 (1969). 
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Prolife supporters argued that Ireland would be required to 
comply with such a finding, since article 53 of the Convention 
provides, "The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by 
the decision of the Court in any case to which they are 
parties."'O 
Fears that abortion might be legalized in Ireland were also 
increased by statistics showing an increase in the number of 
Irish women having abortions in England from 64 in 1968 to 
more than 3,600 in 1981.'l Such figures lent credibility to fears 
that Irish legislators might be more willing to adopt some form 
of abortion legislation, particularly in light of references to ther- 
apeutic abortion made previously in Irish parliamentary 
debates.'* 
Proposals (1) to extend jurisdiction to allow criminal prose- 
cution of Irish women who had abortions abroad, (2) to enjoin 
women from leaving Ireland for abortions, and (3) to criminally 
prosecute abortion referral agencies were dismissed as either un- 
manageable or ~ndesireable.'~ Conservative lawyers considered 
an amendment to the constitution as more effective in preserv- 
ing the existing laws against ab~rt ion. '~ They argued that an 
amendment would have the double effect of prohibiting the Oi- 
reachtas from introducing abortion legislation, while at  the same 
time preventing the Irish Supreme Court from holding that sec- 
tions 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act were 
unc~nstitutional.'~ 
In light of these developments, on April 27, 1981 "a group of 
organisations acting with the full support of the Professors of 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology in the Irish Univer~ities"'~ launched 
70. CONVENTION, supra note 69, art. 53, reprinted in J. FAWCET~, supra note 69, at 
337. 
71. O'Leary, The Management of Problem Pregnancies, in ABORTION OW 69 
(1983). These figures only represent the number of Irish women having abortions at En- 
glish clinics who used their Irish addresses. 
72. See SEN. DEB. 560-62 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1973). 354-56 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1974). 
73. Binchy, supra note 19, at 106-08; see generally Findlay, Criminal Liability for 
Complicity in Abortions Committed Outside Ireland, 15 IRISH JURIST 88 (1980). 
74. Binchy, supra note 19, at 108. 
75. THE IRISH ASSOCIATION F LAWYERS FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE UNBORN, THE 
ABORTION REFERENDUM 2 (1983). 
76. SEN. DEB. 554-55 (daily ed. May 4, 1983) (citing a news release entitled Cam- 
paign for Pro-Life Amendment to the Constitution, Apr. 27, 1981). 
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the campaign for a constitutional amendment to protect the life 
of the unborn. Under the Irish Constitution, an amendment 
must be initiated as a bill in the Dail (house of representatives), 
passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas, and submitted by ref- 
erendum to the people.77 The amendment is considered ap- 
proved if it receives a majority of the votes in the referend~m.'~ 
Because of these constitutional requirements, the Pro-life 
Amendment Campaign (PLAC) sought the support of the lead- 
ing political parties for an amendment to the constitution that 
would provide for an "absolute right to life."79 
The campaign was timed perfectly because a general elec- 
tion was called within six weeks of its inception. Opposition to 
the amendment by any political party might have been inter- 
preted by the electorate as a proabortion stance-a position no 
party could afford in a country that is ninety-five percent Catho- 
l i~.~O Three weeks after the campaign had been launched, the 
Fianna Fail Government and the opposition Fine Gael Party 
publicly stated that they were totally and unalterably opposed 
to abortion and promised to introduce an amendment to the 
cons t i t u t i~n .~~  The other major party, Labour, stated that it was 
"unequivocally opposed to abortion and would give serious con- 
sideration" to the idea of an amendment.82 
The Fine Gael Party achieved a narrow victory in the June 
77. IRISH CONST. art. 46.2. 
78. Id. art. 47.1. 
79. SEN. DEB. 555 (daily ed. May 4, 1983) (citing a news release entitled Campaign 
for Pro-Life Amendment to the Constitution, Apr. 27, 1981). The statement provided: 
While the precise wording of the actual amendment will be a matter for 
others, in accordance with legal advice available to us it is proposed that it be 
along the following lines: 
"The State recognises the absolute right to life of every unborn child from 
conception, and accordingly guarantees to respect and protect such rights by 
law." 
80. W. Binchy, supra note 61, a t  1 n.2. 
81. The official Fianna Fail statement read: 
The Government are [sic] totally opposed to abortion, and an appropriate con- 
stitutional amendment to give effect to the position will be brought forward as 
soon as circumstances permit. The Government will also continue to take the 
necessary steps to prevent abortion referral and seek to alleviate the causes 
which may lead to abortion. 
Pro-Life Amendment Campaign, Information Sheet No. 2 (June 1981). The Fine Gael 
Party statement stated, "Fine Gael is unalterably opposed to the legalisation of abortion 
and in Government will initiate a referendum to guarantee the right to life of the unborn 
child. Fine Gael recognises that a pro-life policy places an obligation upon us to support 
the single mother." Id. 
82. Id. 
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election. Once in power the new Taoiseach (prime minister), 
Garret FitzGerald, confirmed his party's preelection commit- 
ment to the amendment,s3 but lacked the time to act because a 
second general election restored power to the Fianna Fail party 
in March 1982.s4 In November of the same year, the third gen- 
eral election in eighteen months was called.s5 The narrowly 
elected governments and the successive election campaigns ena- 
bled the organizers of PLAC to exert pressure on deputies 
(members of parliament) and aspiring deputies to support a con- 
stitutional amendment. 
On November 2, 1982, during its final days in power, Fianna 
Fail introduced a bills6 that proposed what eventually became 
the wording of the amendment. I t  provided, "The State ac- 
knowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard 
to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to 
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vin- 
dicate that right."87 
Within days, the Fine Gael Party issued a statement sup- 
porting the wording of the amendment,ss and FitzGerald stated 
that the wording was "about as good a formula as you could 
get."8B He later regretted this statement. 
The third general election also failed to produce a clear win- 
ner. This caused Fine Gael and Labour to form a coalition gov- 
ernment that continues in power today.B0 By this time, liberal 
members of Fine Gael and Labour were beginning to be con- 
cerned about the wording of the abortion referendum. It was 
83. The Prime Minister stated: "The Government is unalterably opposed to the 
legalisation of abortion and is committed to taking whatever steps are necessary to en- 
sure that an appropriate amendment is brought forward. The Attorney General is now 
examining the form such an amendment might take." Letter from Garret FitzGerald to 
Dr. Julia Vaughan (Aug. 5, 1981), reprinted in SEN. DEB. 557 (daily ed. May 4,1983) (Dr. 
Julia Vaughan was chairman of PLAC). 
84. N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1982, a t  3, col. 4. 
85. Under the Irish system of government, a general election is called if the National 
Parliament, by a simple majority, gives a vote of "no confidence" in the government. 
86. Eighth Amendment to the Constitution Bill (1982). 
87. Eighth Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1983, pt. 11. 
88. 339 DAIL DEB. 1374 (1983) (quoting a statement issued by Fine Gael Party on 
Wednesday, Nov. 3, 1982). The statement declared, "The Fine Gael Party welcomes the 
form of the Amendment to the Constitution proposed by the Government. The Amend- 
ment as proposed is worded in positive terms, designed to strengthen the Constitutional 
protection of life, as proposed by the leader of Fine Gael . . . ." 
89. SEN. DEB. 860 (daily ed. May 11, 1983) (quoting from a transcript of "Today 
Tonight," Radio Telefis Eireann [Irish National Television], November 4, 1982). 
90. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1982, a t  14, col. 3. 
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feared that the amendment might provide for an absolute, une- 
quivocal right to life. There was also discomfort a t  the growing 
criticisms from protestant churches about the matter and appre- 
hension that the amendment would not fit into the Prime Minis- 
ter's plans for a pluralist, secular state.s1 As a result, the coali- 
tion government refused to support the amendment as it was 
worded, arguing that it was sectarian and ambiguou~.'~ This 
spawned a national controversy described by one commentator 
as "our moral civil war."s3 
A major division soon emerged. The prolife groups consisted 
of conservative members of the legal and medical profession. 
Such groups were strongly supported by the Fianna Fail Party 
and the Catholic The anti-amendment groups were a 
loose coalition of proclioice groups-feminists, trade unions, and 
liberal politicians-and somewhat more conservative groups 
made up of politicians, concerned members of the legal and 
medical professions, and most of the protestant churches and la- 
91. Uniting the Catholic Right, in "THE ABORTION REFERENDUM"-THE CASE 
AGAINST 13, 23 (M. Arnold & P. Kirby eds. 1983). 
92. See 339 DAIL DEB. 1353-68 (1983). 
93. Rights for the Unborn, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 1984, at  39, 40 (quoting an 
editorial in The Irish Press, Aug. 29, 1983). 
94. The Catholic Church enthusiastically encouraged its members to vote for the 
amendment. In a letter read to all Catholic congregations in the Dublin diocese on Sun- 
day, Apr. 10, 1983, Archbishop Ryan stated: 
Attempts have been made to raise issues which have little or nothing to do 
with the central point. Sectarianism has been mentioned, as if it were a ques- 
tion of deciding between the views of various churches. It  is not. The question 
is whether the people of Ireland want, or do not want, to give to the unborn 
child a greater legal protection than it has at  present. This is not in any sense a 
"Church" matter. It  is rather a matter of the basic human right to life. It  can 
hardly be called "sectarian" to say that this right to life belongs to all, not just 
to some. 
Letter from Archbishop Ryan to all Catholic congregations in the Dublin diocese (Apr. 4, 
1983). 
A statement from the Irish Episcopal conference concluded: "A decisive 'Yes' to the 
Amendment will, we believe, in the words of Pope John Paul I1 in Limerick, constitute a 
'witness before Europe and before the whole world to the dignity and sacredness of all 
human life, from conception until death.' " The Amendment-A Statement from the 
Irish Episcopal Conference, (Veritas Publications Aug. 22, 1983). 
Finally, a statement by the Archbishop of Dublin, Dr. Ryan, read at  all Catholic 
churches three days before the national referendum concluded: 
Over the last few weeks many people have been asking me for guidance. My 
advice to them, and to all of you, is that a "Yes" vote on Wednesday will pro- 
tect the right to life of the unborn child; it will not create a threat to expectant 
mothers; it will block any attempt to legalise abortion in this country. 
Letter from Archbishop Ryan to all Catholic congregations in the Dublin diocese (Sept. 
1, 1983). 
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ity, who, although opposed to the introduction of abortion legis- 
lation, either opposed the need for an amendment or objected to 
its sectarian nature." 
Allegations of sectarianism resulted from the similarities in 
the proposed amendment to the Catholic doctrine of "double ef- 
fect." This doctrine, which permits an operation to remove a wo- 
man's cancerous womb with the resultant inevitable death of the 
fetus, is based on the rationale that the primary intention-the 
removal of a diseased organ-justifies the secondary effect-the 
death of the fetus.96 Right wing prolife supporters argued that 
such actions are not abortions but are merely unfortunate conse- 
quences that result from such operations. Dr. Julia Vaughan, 
Chairman of the Pro-Life Amendment Campaign explained: 
Doctors who participate in these procedures are not performing 
abortions. I t  cannot be too strongly emphasized that they are 
not abortions in either medical or legal terms. In each case, the 
removal of a pathological organ is carried out to save women's 
life, not in order to kill the fetus. The pregnancy is not directly 
attacked, even though its loss may be the inevitable conse- 
quence of treatment which has as its objective the "good" of 
saving the life of the mother." 
Prolife supporters argued that the rights of the unborn were ab- 
solute and unequivocal, and that no exceptions existed to a gen- 
eral prohibition on abortion.98 Protestants and prochoice sup- 
porters considered this a flagrant attempt by right wing prolife 
supporters who, while claiming to be nonsectarian, were at- 
tempting to have the permissible parameters of Irish abortion 
law defined in a very Roman Catholic way." 
In contrast, Fine Gael's opposition was directed toward the 
wording of the amendment. The Director of Public Prosecutions 
and the Attorney General issued statements that mirrored these 
concerns. The Director of Public Prosecution stated that while 
he would have no difficulty prosecuting an unlawful abortion 
under the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act, he would expe- 
95. For a sizeable but not exhaustive list of statements, see Protestant Churches' 
Statements, in "THE ABORTION REFERENDUM"-THE CASE AGAINST 61-65 (M. Arnold & 
P. Kirby eds. 1983). 
96. Uniting the Catholic Right, supra note 91. 
97. J. Vaughan, Pro-Life Amendment Campaign-A Response to Prof. O'Mahony 
(May 19, 1982). 
98. O'Mahony, A Catholic View, in "THE ABORTION REFERENDUM"-THE CASE 
AGAINST 35, 37 (M. Arnold & P. Kirby eds. 1983). 
99. Id. 
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rience "grave difficulty" in maintaining prosecutions in many 
cases if the amendment passed.loO The Attorney General at- 
tacked the wording of the amendment. 
[The] wording is ambiguous and unsatisfactory. It will lead in- 
evitably to confusion and uncertainty, not merely amongst the 
medical profession, to whom it has of course particular rele- 
vance, but also amongst lawyers and more specifically the 
judges who will have to interpret it. Far from providing the 
protection and certainty which is sought by many of those who 
have advocated its adoption, it will have a contrary effect. 
In particular it is not clear as to what life is being pro- 
tected; as to whether "the unborn" is protected from the mo- 
ment of fertilisation or alternatively is left unprotected until 
an independently viable human being exists at 25 to 28 weeks. 
Further, having regard to the equal rights of the unborn 
and the mother, a doctor faced with the dilemma of saving the 
life of the mother, knowing that to do so will terminate the life 
of "the unborn," will be compelled by the wording to conclude 
that he can do nothing. Whatever his intentions, he will have 
to show equal regard for both lives, and his predominent intent 
will not be a factor. 
In those circumstances I cannot approve of the wording 
proposed.'O1 
Fianna Fail, the party that proposed the wording of the 
amendment, and the members of PLAC maintained that the 
wording was adequate to protect the rights of the unborn. They 
argued that  there was no justification for the "needless anxiety" 
that  had been generated concerning the consequences of the 
amendment's adoption.lo2 The  Irish Association of Lawyers for 
the Defence of the Unborn stated bluntly, "We unequivocally 
maintain that there is nothing in the original wording which 
would oblige an  Irish Court to  make such a grotesque decision as  
that suggested by Mr. Sutherland [Attorney General]."lo3 
On April 27, 1983, in response to  these concerns, Fine Gael 
introduced a more simply worded version of the amendment 
which stated, "Nothing in this Constitution shall be invoked to 
invalidate, or to deprive of force or effect any provision of a law 
100. 340 DAIL DEB. 474 (1983) (statement of the Director of Public Prosecutions). 
101. SEN. DEB. 520 (daily ed. May 4, 1983) (statement of Attorney General, Mr. Pe- 
ter D. Sutherland, S.C., quoted from The Irish Times, Feb. 16, 1983). 
102. SEN DEB 1265 (daily ed. May 26, 1983). 
103. Id. (quoting statement of The Irish Association of Lawyers for the Defence of 
the Unborn). 
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on the ground that it prohibits abortion."lo4 Fine Gael argued 
that this wording avoided the multiple interpretations of the Fi- 
anna Fail amendment and made it easier for the public to un- 
derstand. At the same time, the proposal fulfilled Fine Gael's 
commitment to introduce an amendment to the constitution 
that would prohibit the introduction of abortion in Ireland.lo5 
However, the wording proposed by Fine Gael proved unaccept- 
able because it did not preclude future legislative repeal of the 
1861 Act and provision for some form of legalized abortion. As a 
result, the Fine Gael proposal was soundly defeated.lo6 
Several other proposals to clarify the wording of the original 
amendment were also presented in the Dail. These included: (I)  
a proposal to delete the word "unborn" and substitute "unborn 
human being,"lo7 (2) a proposal to delete "with due regard to the 
equal right to life of the mother7' and substitute "subject to the 
right of the mother to life and bodily integrity,"lo8 and (3) a pro- 
posal to insert after "practicable" the words "without interfer- 
ence with any existing right or lawful opportunity of any citi- 
zen."lo9 Each proposal was soundly defeated.l1•‹ Similar 
proposals were made in the Senate (1) to modify the wording of 
the amendment by inserting "which shall not include the fer- 
tilised ovum prior to the time a t  which such fertilised ovum be- 
comes implanted in the wall of the uterus" after the word "un- 
born"ll' and (2) to delete the word "equal" and substitute the 
word "prior."l12 Each of these proposals was also defeated. 
The amendment, as originally worded by Fianna Fail, 
passed overwhelmingly in the Dail,l13 with Fine Gael abstaining 
from the vote and Labour voting against it. Thereafter, Garret 
FitzGerald, the Taoiseach, issued a statement expressing his re- 
gret that he had supported the idea of an amendment. FitzGer- 
ald asked the people to vote against the amendment because it 
104. 341 DAIL DEB. 2001 (1983). 
105. SEN. DEB 935 (daily ed. May 18, 1983). 
106. 341 DAIL DEB. 2225-30 (1983). 
107. Id. at 2229. 
108. Id.  at 2230. 
109. Id. at  2231. 
110. Id.  at 2233-38. 
111. SEN. DEB 1092 (daily ed. May 25, 1983). The proposal was defeated by a vote of 
18 to 10. Id. at 1149-50. 
1.12. Id. at 1154. The proposal was defeated by a vote of 15 to 8, SEN. DEB. 1281-82 
(daily ed. May 26, 1983). 
113. 341 DAIL DEB. 2235-38 (1983). 
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was "ambiguous and unclear"'14 and could lead to the death of 
women "whose lives are now saved in all hospitals in accordance 
with universal medical practi~e.""~ Despite FitzGerald7s plea, on 
September 7, 1983, in one of the smallest voter turnouts in Irish 
history, the electorate voted by a two-to-one majority to include 
the amendment in the Irish Constit~tion."~ 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE AMENDMENT 
The eighth amendment to the Irish Constitution grew out of 
the desire of prolife groups and concerned citizens to further 
protect the rights of the unborn. The challenge faced by the 
drafters was to produce an amendment that would legally pro- 
tect the rights of the unborn, while at  the same time not create 
an absolute right that would supersede the already guaranteed 
personal rights of the citizen."' 
Despite the powerful endorsement the amendment received 
at  the polls, it poses several problems. The most serious chal- 
lenge is likely to be directed at  thelanguage of the amendment 
itself. The amendment guarantees the "right to life of the un- 
born" but fails to indicate at  what point that "unborn" life be- 
gins. Admittedly, this is not an easy question, but it is a funda- 
mental question that must be answered. The United States 
Supreme Court in Roe v. Wadells noted that due to the "wide 
divergence of thinking" among philosophers, theologians and 
physicians, it could not resolve the "difficult question of when 
life begins."l19 Yet, the United States Supreme Court's failure to 
resolve the question combined with their refusal to protect the 
fetus until the time of viability (24-28 weeks) practically re- 
sulted in recognition that life does not exist prior to that time. 
114. Keenan, A Verbal War of Morality, MACLEAN'S, ept. 19, 1983, a t  53. 
115. Kirby, A Pyrrhic Victory-Disarray Over Abortion, COMMONWEAL, Oct. 7, 1983, 
a t  519, col. 1. As a result of this statement, the anti-amendment groups adopted the 
slogan, "This amendment could kill women." 
116. Id. a t  518. The turnout a t  the polls was only 5470, extremely low compared to 
the 70% plus that usually turn out to vote in Ireland. This may be a reflection of the 
difficulty people had in deciding which way to vote. Significant, too, is that in Dublin the 
vote was split almost evenly, with 48% for the amendment and 51% against, indicating 
that the rural vote was mainly responsible for the passage of the amendment by the 2-1 
margin. 
117. O'Mahony, Medical Ethics in the Pluralistic State, in ABORTION AND LAW 40, 
46 (A. Flannery ed. 1983). 
118. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
119. Id. a t  159-60. 
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This avoidance of the question of when life begins has been 
sharply criticized by one Irish commentator: 
This failure of either English or American law to resolve the 
basic question of the humanity of the unborn child must be 
criticised, whatever the true motives of the courts or legislature 
may be. If, on the one hand, there is a genuine reluctance to 
determine the issue, this may be criticised on the basis that the 
question is so fundamental that it requires to be resolved 
before any other subsidiary issues are determined. Moreover, a 
Court which is too timid to resolve such a basic moral issue 
could scarcely feel itself competent to determine other equally 
important moral questions in the legal forum. 
If, on the other hand, the apparent failure to determine 
the issue amounts in reality to a decision that the unborn child 
is not a human being, then the courts and legislature should 
have the courage to say so clearly and be judged accordingly. 
From the standpoint of the child, the failure to resolve the is- 
sue of his humanity amounts in result to a finding that he is 
not a human being.lZ0 
This criticism is particularly applicable to  the Irish legisla- 
;ure because i t  holds the exclusive constitutional power to make 
laws for the state.121 This makes legislators responsible for vigor- 
ously debating the issues, considering all possible ramifications, 
and coming up with the clearest language possible before 
presenting to the people a proposed amendment of the constitu- 
tion. This does not require legislators to determine the exact 
moment when human life begins for all purposes. However, it 
does require the election of a specific cognizable time a t  which 
the law is prepared to  protect the unborn's right to life. 
The  amendment's failure to define when the unborn is con- 
stitutionally protected means the judiciary will eventually have 
to  formulate the definition; the very result the prolife campaign- 
ers sought to  avoid.122 This has caused uncertainty about the ef- 
fect of the amendment. The Attorney General has stated: 
In the event that the Supreme Court is called upon to con- 
strue the proposal, it could come to a number of different con- 
clusions as to the definition of the class which is afforded pro- 
120. Binchy, supra note 19, a t  99 (emphasis in original). 
121. IRISH CONST. art. 15.2.1 provides that "[tlhe sole and exclusive power of making 
laws for the State is hereby vested in the Oireachtas: no other legislative authority has 
power to make laws for the State." 
122. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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tection. Undoubtedly a view which might commend itself to 
the court is that all human beings fall within the ambit of the 
amendment, and that a human being comes into existence 
when the process of fertilisation is complete. 
If, as would appear to be the case, it is correct to state that 
certain contraceptives can operate after fertilisation, then these 
would be abortifacient if human life commences on conception. 
Thus the importation, dissemination and use of such contra- 
ceptives would be prohibited, and as an example, the use of the 
"morning-after" pill in the treatment of rape victims will not 
be permissable, nor will the use of such contraceptives in cer- 
tain conditions of the health of a woman-e.g. valvular heart 
disease or diabetes. 
. . . .  
However, the point of time for which the most compelling 
legal argument could be made, other than the time of fertilisa- 
tion, as being the moment of commencement of protection, 
could be said to be the time when the foetus becomes indepen- 
dently viable. I understand that this is probably at some time 
between 25 and 28 weeks of pregnancy. 
Such a construction could be supported by an argument 
that "unborn" could be regarded as being applicable only to 
something capable of being born. The word "unborn" used as a 
noun must, as a matter of language, mean "unborn person", 
"unborn child" or "unborn human being". I t  could be argued 
that neither a fertilised ovum, a fertilised and implanted ovum, 
an embryo or even a foetus prior to the time when it is inde- 
pendently viable, would come within this definition. 
The consequences of such a finding could be that there 
would be no constitutional prohibition on abortion prior to this 
stage of pregnancy.lZ3 
I t  is possible that a future Irish Supreme Court may choose 
to interpret the amendment in a liberal manner, particularly if 
Irish public opinion moves toward acceptance of some form of 
abortion. This could place Ireland in a situation similar to that 
of the United States where the generally proabortion courts 
have thus far succeeded in liberalizing abortion legislation de- 
spite the contrary views of generally prolife legislatures. In real- 
ity, this is not likely to occur because of past developments in 
123. SEN DEB 524-26 (daily ed May 4, 1983) (statement of Attorney General, Mr 
Peter D. Sutherland, S.C., quoted from The Irish Times, Feb. 16, 1983) 
3711 RIGHT TO LIFE 393 
Irish family law and the happenings accompanying the move- 
ment to amend the constitution. 
The justices cannot avoid being influenced by the strong 
public stance against the introduction of abortion legislation in 
Ireland. Even prior to passage of the amendment, the Irish Su- 
preme Court intimated that the right to life of the unborn would 
be ~ r 0 t e c t e d . l ~ ~  Although dicta,12& these statements have not 
been challenged and cannot go unnoticed. Admittedly, the Irish 
Supreme Court looks upon decisions of the United States Su- 
preme Court with great respect,12'j and has even made extensive 
use of American decisions in formulating the concept of marital 
privacy in McGee.12' However, it does not necessarily follow that 
the Irish Supreme Court will track the judicial trend developed 
in the United States in relation to abortion. Past experience in- 
dicates the opposite may be true. In the decade since Roe, the 
United States has become more liberal,lZ8 while Ireland has be- 
come more conservative. 
At most, the impact of McGee is limited to the 1979 passage 
of the Health (Family Planning) Act,129 which permits limited 
access to contraceptives. In drafting the Health Act, the Irish 
legislature clearly stated the Act was not to be used as a step- 
ping-stone to some form of abortion legislation. Section 10 pro- 
vides: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing . . . 
the procuring of abortion . . . ."130 The act is so restrictive to- 
ward abortion that it provides that the Censorship Board may 
ban a book that "advocates or might reasonably be supposed to 
advocate the procurement of abortion or miscarriage or any 
124. See supra notes 60 & 63 and accompanying text. 
125 See supra note 64. 
126 See supra note 59. 
127 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. 
128 See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481 
(1983) (an abortion performed after the first trimester need not be performed in a hospl- 
tal, state may not Impose a blanket provlslon requiring parental consent for an abortion 
for an unmarried minor; state cannot require instructions by attending physician as to 
fetal development and alternatives to abortion); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1978) 
(struck down a statute that requ~red postviability abort~ons to  be by such method as to 
give the fetus the best opportunity of surviving); Planned Parenthood v Danforth, 428 
U S. 52 (1976) (a woman's decision to have an abortion cannot be made subject to paren- 
tal or spousal consent). 
129. PUB GEN ACTS, no. 20 (1979). 
130. Id •˜ 10(a). 
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method, treatment or appliance to be used for the purpose of 
such pr~curement." '~~ 
Other operative acts also suggest that the unborn child is a 
persona judicata. Section 58 of the Civil Liability pro- 
vides for recovery, by a child, of damages for injuries caused 
before birth: "For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared 
that the law relating to wrongs shall apply to an unborn child 
for his protection in like manner as if the child were born, pro- 
vided the child is subsequently born alive."133 Similarly, the 
Succession gives inheritance rights to a child en ventre sa 
mere who is not illegitimate, provided the child is subsequently 
born a 1 i ~ e . l ~ ~  
More significantly, the parliamentary debates during the 
campaign to amend the constitution were devoid of any sugges- 
tion that abortion in any form ought to be legalized. Each of the 
major parliamentary parties also publicly stated that they op- 
posed ab0rti0n.l~~ Similarly, nearly all of the churches that re- 
leased statements indicated their opposition to the introduction 
of abortion legislation, and their support of the right to life of 
the unborn.13' Moreover, the Irish people approved the amend- 
ment by a two-to-one margin.138 Indeed, just four months before 
the amendment inevitably passed,138 the Irish Supreme Court, in 
Norris u. Attorney General,140 a case concerning the constitu- 
tionality of legislation against homosexuality, commented on the 
abortion issue. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice O'Higgins 
stated: 
A right to privacy or, as it has been put, a right "to be let 
alone," can never be absolute. There are many acts done in pri- 
Id •˜ 12(1). 
PUB GEN ACTS, no. 41, •˜ 58 (1961). 
Id. 
PUB GEN ACTS, no. 27 (1965). 
Id  •˜ 3(2). 
See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. 
See supra notes 94-95. 
See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
The Women's Right to Choose Campaign, in a recent discuss~on of their ad- 
- - 
mendment campaign, admitted, "The function of our organization was to present a rlght 
to choose argument against the amendment's provisions. We were in existence as a point 
of principle-we had no illusions about the likely effectiveness of our propaganda." 
Fighting for Control-The Ongozng Struggle for Reproductive Rights 7, 16, in THE IRISH 
FEMINIST REVIEW (Womens Community Press 1984). 
140. W BINCHY, A CASEBOOK ON IRISH FAMILY LAW (1984) (Ir Sup Ct., Apr. 22, 
1983, as yet unreported in Ir. R.). 
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vate which the State is entitled to condemn, whether such be 
done by an individual on his own or with another. The law has 
always condemned abortion, incest, suicide attempts, suicide 
pacts, euthanasia or ,mercy killing. These are prohibited simply 
because they are morally wrong and regardless of the fact, 
which may exist in some instances, that no harm or injury to 
others is involved.'"' 
Justice McCarthy was even more effusive. In a dissenting opin- 
ion, he stated: 
I cannot delimit the area in which the State may constitu- 
tionally intervene so as to restrict the right to privacy, nor can 
I overlook the present public debate concerning the criminal 
law, arising from the statute of 1861, as to abortion-the kill- 
ing of an unborn child. I t  is not an issue that arises in the in- 
stant case, but it may be claimed that the right of privacy of a 
pregnant woman would extend to a right in her to terminate 
pregnancy, an act which would involve depriving the unborn 
child of the most fundamental right of all-the right to life 
itself.'"* 
He then suggested that the right to life of the unborn was pro- 
tected by the preamble to the constitution that acknowledges 
Jesus Christ and the principles of Chri~tianity."~ He concluded: 
For myself, I am content to say that the provisions of the 
Preamble which I have quoted earlier in this judgment would 
appear to lean heavily against any view other than that the 
right to life of the unborn is a sacred trust to which all organs 
of government must lend their support.14" 
Against this background, it is unlikely that any member of the 
141. Id. a t  379. 
142. Id. a t  387. 
143. IRISH CONST. preamble. It states: 
In the name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to 
Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred, 
We the People of Eire [Ireland], Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to 
our divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of 
trial, Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain 
the rightful independence of our Nation, And seeking to promote the common 
good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dig- 
nity and freedom of the individual may be assured, true social order attained, 
the unity of our country restored, and concord established with other nations, 
Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves, this Constitution. 
144. W. BINCHY, supra note 140, at 387. 
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Irish Supreme Court would interpret the amendment in such a 
manner as to defeat the right to life of the ~ n b 0 r n . l ~ ~  
The language of the amendment is deliberately general, just 
as is every other article of the constitution. The amendment was 
not intended to outline every possible eventuality, but rather to 
give adequate guidelines to the courts to enable them to make 
reasonable decisions.146 The amendment is modelled after and 
uses language nearly identical to that found in the constitutional 
provision that protects the rights of the citizen. That provision 
states: "The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and as far as 
practicable by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal 
rights of the citizen."147 Because this wording has provided ade- 
quate protection for the rights of Irish citizens since 1937, it is 
not surprising that similar wording was used to protect the 
rights of the unborn. 
Opponents of the amendment have also been critical of the 
phrase "with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother." 
The Attorney General elaborated: 
The meaning of "with due regard to" is entirely unclear. These 
words are generally perceived to allow for, at  least, termination 
of the life of the foetus in the cases of ectopic pregnancy or 
cancer of the uterus. The words "with due regard to" have 
been understood by many to suggest that the right to life en- 
joyed by the unborn was to be confined in some way. That in- 
terpretation is in my opinion incorrect. (The word 
"comhcheart" in the Irish text is literally "the same right.") 
The right to life of both the unborn and the mother is stated in 
the proposed text to be equal, and in these circumstances I 
cannot see how it could be possible knowingly to terminate the 
existence of the unborn even if such termination were the sec- 
ondary effect of an operation for another purpose. 
. . . .  
If a doctor were to be faced with the choice as to saving 
the life of one, and thereby terminating the life of the other, 
then I believe that the only lawful conclusion to this dilemma 
would be that he could do nothing, absolutely nothing, which 
145. Similarly, criticism of the amendment because it may effectively ban contra- 
ceptives that are considered abortifacient is misguided since such contraceptives are al- 
ready prohibited by the Health (Family Planning) Act. See supra notes 129-30 and ac- 
companying text. 
146. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children, The Pro-Life Amendment- 
Questions and Answers, Fact Sheet No. 3 (1983). 
147. IRISH CONST. art. 40.3.1. 
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infringed on either right. I t  is only where there is no possibility 
of the foetus surviving, even without the doctor's intervention, 
that no difficulty will a r i~e . "~  
While this argument is superficially appealing, the only al- 
ternative is to resolve the equality issue between the mother and 
the unborn by giving one or the other greater rights. This 
presents even greater difficulties. Affording greater rights to the 
mother would cater to the prochoice lobby, which views the 
rights of the mother as always superior to those of the unborn. 
This is not in keeping with the purpose of the amendment to 
further protect the right to life of the unborn. Conversely, af- 
fording greater rights to the unborn would cater to the right 
wing prolife lobby, which views the rights of the unborn as abso- 
lute and unequivocal, with no exceptions save those covered by 
the Catholic doctrine of double effect. This position is also unac- 
ceptable because there really is no such thing as an absolute 
right to life. The common law, based on the biblical command, 
"Thou shall not kill"14@ admits to exceptions such as self-de- 
fense. The right to life of the unborn is subject to exceptions as 
well. Even some staunch prolife supporters recognize this. Fa- 
ther Haring, a noted Catholic theologian, has stated: 
I consider probable the opinion of those who justify the re- 
moval of a foetus that surely cannot survive, when the action is 
taken in order to prevent grave damage to the mother. For in- 
stance, an anencephalic foetus not only cannot develop into a 
conscious human life but cannot survive. To remove it in order 
to spare great damage to the mother is truly therapeutic, while 
no injustice is done to the life of the foetus already doomed to 
death.lS0 
Under these circumstances, the only logical solution was to 
give both mother and unborn an equal statutory right to life, 
allowing the judiciary to decide each case on the facts. The fact 
that both mother and unborn have equal rights does not prevent 
any action from being taken in cases of conflict as suggested by 
the Attorney General. Such a conclusion defies common sense, 
suggesting that if two patients needed a life support system to 
148. SEN. DEB. 540 (daily ed. May 4, 1983) (statement of Attorney General, Mr. Pe- 
ter D. Sutherland, S.C., quoted from The Irish Times, Feb. 16, 1983). 
149. Exodus 20:13 (King James). 
150. O'Mahony, A Catholic View, in "THE ABORTION REFERENDUM"-THE CASE 
AGAINST 35, 38 (M. Arnold & P. Kirby eds. 1983). 
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stay alive, but only one was available, the doctor could not util- 
ize the system for either patient since it would interfere with the 
equal right to life of the other. 
In addition, the amendment merely states that the equal 
rights of the mother and the unborn will be defended and vindi- 
cated by Irish laws only "as far as practicable." The Irish trans- 
lation, recognized by the constitution as the prevailing language 
in cases of conflict,161 reads: "sa mheid gur feidir e," which liter- 
ally translated means "as far as possible." This phrase also ap- 
pears as part of the article of the constitution into which the 
amendment was inc~rporated. '~~ Under either translation, the 
language makes allowance for situations that may arise where it 
is not "practicable" or even "possible" to protect the right to life 
of the unborn. 
The equal rights provision of the Irish Constitution, in- 
cluded in the same article as the prolife amendment, also recog- 
nizes this. I t  states: "All citizens shall, as human persons, be 
held equal before the law. This shall not be held to mean that 
the State shall not in its enactments have due regard to differ- 
ences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social function."153 
In 1972, in O'Brien v. Keogh,154 the Irish Supreme Court sug- 
gested that "equal" may not mean a mathematical equality. 
Chief Justice OyDalaigh stated that, "Article 40 does not require 
identical treatment of all persons without recognition of differ- 
ences in relevant circumstances. It only forbids invidious 
discriminati~n."'~~ 
Justice Walsh previously commented in State v. An Bord 
Uchtala:166 
In the opinion of the Court section 1 of Article 40 is not to be 
read as a guarantee or undertaking that all citizens shall be 
treated by the law as equal for all purposes, but rather as an 
acknowledgment of the human equality of all citizens and that 
such equality will be recognised in the laws of the State. The 
section itself in its provision, "this shall not be held to mean 
that the State shall not in its enactments have due regard to 
151. IRISH CONST. art. 25.4.6. This article provides: "In case of conflict between the 
texts of a law enrolled under this section in both the official languages, the text in the 
national language shall prevail." 
152. Id. art. 40.3.1. 
153. Id. art. 40.1. 
154. 1972 Ir. R. 144. 
155. Id. at 156. 
156. 1966 Ir. R. 567. 
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differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social func- 
tion," is a recognition that inequality may or must result from 
some special abilities or from some deficiency or from some 
special need and it is clear that the Article does not either en- 
visage or guarantee equal measure in all things to all citizens. 
To do so regardless of the factors mentioned would be 
ineq~ality. '~~ 
More realistically, the weakness of the constitutional right 
to life for the unborn is that the unborn, by its nature, cannot 
assert that right. Therefore, this right must be capable of being 
asserted by a third party. Those opposed to the amendment 
feared that individuals concerned about the rights of the un- 
born, might be able to obtain injunctions to prevent Irish women 
from going abroad to have abortions. Technically this appears 
possible. The Irish Supreme Court stated in Cahill u. S u t t ~ n , ' ~ ~  
that, while the general rule of standing is that "the challenger 
must adduce circumstances showing that the impugned provi- 
sion is operating, or is poised to operate, in such a way as to 
deprive him personally of the benefit of a particular constitu- 
tional right,"159 third parties, in "exceptional cases, hopefully 
rare," may also be heard on behalf of persons who cannot assert 
their own rights.leO The pertinent question is the likelihood that 
third parties will stalk women they suspect may go abroad to 
have an abortion. In all probability, it can be expected that such 
injunctive actions, if they are permitted by the Irish courts, 
would generally be brought by the father. If such a situation 
were to arise, the judiciary would have to resolve the matter 
with due regard for the rights of all parties. 
Lastly, Ireland is a signator of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.lel Therefore, the 
validity of the Irish constitutional amendment may be chal- 
lenged in the European courts. The European Commission, 
charged with ensuring compliance with the provisions of the 
Convention, could find Ireland in violation of one of the articles 
of the convention. However, this is unlikely in view of previous 
abortion decisions by the Commission, which demonstrate its re- 
luctance to interfere with abortion legislation in individual 
157. Id. at 639. 
158. 1980 Ir. R. 269. 
159. Id. at 282. 
160. Id. at 277. 
161. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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member countries.ls2 Even if the amendment was determined to 
162. The first abortion case before the Commission was brought in the 1960s by a 
Norwegian man challenging a Norwegian abortion law as violative of the rights of the 
unborn. He claimed the unborn was protected under the language of article two of the 
Convention which provided, "Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law." The 
Commission found the petition was inadmissible on the grounds that "only a victim of 
an alleged violation of the convention may bring an application" and that the Norwegian 
petitioner, who declared that he acted in the interest of third persons, "could not claim 
to be himself the victim of a violation of the Convention." Gorby, The West German 
Abortion Decision before the European Commission on Human Rights, in NEW PER- 
SPECTIVES ON HUMAN ABORTION 264 (1981) (quoting Application No. 86760, Collection of 
Decisions 6, a t  34). 
The first abortion case actually decided by the Commission was Bruggerinann & 
Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1978 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 638 
(Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights). Two West German women claimed that (1) a decision 
of the West German Constitutional Court that invalidated part of a 1974 abortion law 
permitting abortions in the first trimester with approval of a doctor and the mother, and 
(2) a subsequent law that prohibited abortion a t  any time absent exceptional circum- 
stances, violated Article 8(1) and other Articles of the Convention. Article 8(1) provides, 
"[Elverybody has the right to respect for his private or family life, his home and his 
correspondence." The Commission held that neither the German abortion legislation nor 
the Federal Constitutional Court's decision violated any Convention right. 
This decision has raised questions about whether the Commission will interfere with 
the abortion laws of individual member States. One commentator suggested that in view 
of the wide divergence of abortion laws among member nations "a decision in Brug- 
gemann and Scheuten's favor would have had the effect of declaring the law on abortion 
in most of the member States incompatible with the European Convention on Human 
Rights-a decision which would hardly inspire confidence in the Commission on Human 
Rights. Gorby, supra, a t  274. He postulated that the decision "reflects the caution of an  
international legal body whose powers of enforcement are minimal." Id.  
The most recent case to come before the Commission, Paton v. United Kingdom, 3 
EUR. HUM. RTS. REP 408 (1980). seems to provide support for this theory. Paton applied 
to the English courts for an  injunction to prevent his wife from getting an abortion. The 
English courts refused to grant the injunction, holding that the father had no right to 
stop the mother from having an abortion, even if he was her husband. Id. a t  410. Paton 
appealed the decision to the Commission, which concluded: 
The Commission . . . does not find that the husband's and potential father's 
right to respect for his private and family life can be interpreted so widely as 
to embrace such procedural rights as claimed by the applicant, i.e. a right to be 
consulted, or a right to make applications, about an  abortion which his wife 
intends to have performed on her. 
Id. a t  417. Before deciding that the application was inadmissible, the Commission con- 
sidered whether article two, while not providing any express limitation concerning the 
fetus, is to be interpreted (1) as not covering the fetus a t  all, (2) as recognizing a right to 
life with certain limitations, or (3) as recognizing an absolute right to life. Id.  a t  415. The 
Commission readily dismissed the idea that the fetus had an absolute right to life, noting 
that almost all signators a t  the time of the signing of the Convention permitted some 
form of abortion legislation. Id. However, the Commission circumvented the more diffi- 
cult questions by concluding: 
The Commission considers that i t  is not in these circumstances called upon to 
decide whether Article 2 does not cover the foetus a t  all or whether it 
recognises a "right to life" of the foetus with implied limitations. I t  finds that 
the authorisation, by the United Kingdom authorities, of the abortion com- 
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violate the Convention, the Commission has no power to order 
changes in the domestic laws of Ireland; Ireland has previously 
ignored decisions of the Commission without any detrimental 
con~equences .~~~  
The Irish prolife amendment grew out of fears that the 
nearly universal trend to liberalize abortion legislation might 
plained of is compatible with Article 2(1), first sentence because, if one as- 
sumes that this provision applies at  the initial stage of the pregnancy, the 
abortion is covered by an implied limitation, protecting the life and health of 
the woman at  that stage, of the "right to life" of the foetus. 
Id. at  416. 
163. The Commission is not a traditional court of appeal. It  may find that a particu- 
lar piece of legislation violates one of the articles of the Convention, but it has no power 
to overrule any domestic law of a member state. Telephone interview with Professor 
John Gorby (Nov. 8, 1984). Admittedly, article 53 does provide, "The High Contracting 
Parties undertake to abide by the decision of the Court in any case to which they are 
parties." This means that, while the Convention, as a treaty, is binding on all states that 
have ratified it, the Commission's decisions are still not enforceable until the Convention 
has been adopted into the domestic law of the state. Ireland has not done this. 
The Irish Constitution provides, "No international agreement shall be part of the 
domestic law of the State save as may be determined by the Oireachtas." IRISH CONST. 
art. 29.6. I t  further states, "The sole and exclusive power of making laws for the State is 
hereby vested in the Oireachtas: no other legislative authority has power to make laws 
for the State." Id. art. 15.2.1. In 1960, the Irish Supreme Court indicated its refusal to 
apply the provisions of the Convention in In re O'Laighleis, 1960 Ir. R. 93. The Court 
stated: 
The Oireachtas has not determined that the Convention of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms is to be part of the domestic law of the State, and 
accordingly this Court cannot give effect to the Convention if it be contrary to 
domestic law or purports to grant rights or impose obligations additional to 
those of domestic law. 
Id. at  125. The situation remains the same today. One commentator recently concluded, 
"Nearly thirty years after ratifying the European Convention on Human Rights, Ireland 
has still failed to incorporate it into domestic law. As a consequence the Irish Courts 
have, for the most part, refused to take cognisance of the provisions of the Convention in 
domestic cases." Comment, The Application of the European Convention on Human 
Rights before the Irish Courts, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 856, 860-61 (1982). 
No action has been taken against Ireland for failing to incorporate the Convention 
into domestic law. It is possible that Ireland could be asked to withdraw or even be 
expelled from the Commission if it were determined that Irish abortion laws violated one 
of the articles of the Convention, and Ireland refused to modify its stance on abortion. 
However, this is highly unlikely in view of what appears to be a clear reluctance on the 
part of the Commission to interfere with abortion legislation in member countries. In the 
35 year existence of the Commission only one country, Greece, has been asked to with- 
draw. and that was for flagrant violations of numerous articles. For a discussion of the - 
relationship between the Convention and the domestic law of the signatories generally, 
and Ireland specifically, see Buergenthal, The Domestic Status of the European Conven- 
tion on Human Rights, 13 BUFFALO L. REV. 354 (1964). 
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eventually reach Ireland. The amendment attempts to constitu- 
tionally establish the ultimate balance between the mother's 
rights and the unborn's right to life. Viewed against the long- 
standing Irish legislative, judicial, and public policy of protect- 
ing the life of the unborn, it appears that the real motivation for 
the amendment was not that the prior law did not adequately 
prevent abortion. Rather, the amendment stemmed from a polit- 
ical and social fear that a clear and dramatic rejection of abor- 
tion was necessary to prevent the country from drifting into a 
slow acceptance of abortion over time, as has happened in most 
other western nations. Once the amendment had been proposed, 
it was also critical that it or some equally strong anti-abortion 
amendment be passed, because a defeat could have been inter- 
preted as a signal that Ireland was ready for some form of abor- 
tion legislat i~n. '~~ 
Interestingly enough, the broad language of the amendment 
may permit rather than prevent the introduction of abortion leg- 
islation in Ireland. However, in spite of the potential problems, 
passage of the amendment by such a large margin can be ex- 
pected to lend a powerful endorsement to the existing prohibi- 
tion of abortion in Ireland.ls6 
John A. Quinlan 
164. This is consistent with a statement made by the Women's Right to Choose 
Group (a separate organization from the Women's Right to Choose Campaign) that con- 
cluded, "[Tlhe current political objective is the defeat of the amendment, the pro-abor- 
tion lobby comes later." Address by Professor Cornelius O'Leary, Vice-chairman of the 
Pro-Life Amendment Campaign (Aug. 16, 1983) (quoting sunday Tribune, May 15, 
1983). 
165. The Women's Right to Choose Campaign has even accepted this conclusion. 
They recently stated: 
By winning the referendum PLAC [Pro-Life Amendment Campaign] have 
[sic] indeed made it impossible for abortion to become legal without another 
referendum on the issue. That does make our long-term task more diffi- 
cult-but only marginally so, because there had been no prospect of achieving 
any liberalisation of the law in the foreseeable future anyway. 
. . . . 
Apart from the Post-Referendum Solidarity March in July 1984 which 
highlighted SPUC's [Society for the Protection of Unborn Children] pickets on 
Open Line [an abortion referral agency in Dublin] and a right to choose 
counter-picket a t  SPUC's referendum anniversary vigil on September 7th this 
year, next to nothing was heard publicly of a pro-abortion nature in 1984. To 
some extent this may be due to sheer weariness, but it also suggests a certain 
level of dismay among right to choose supporters. 
Fighting for Control-the Ongoing Struggle for Reproductive Rights, in THE IRISH FEMI- 
NIST REVIEW 7, 23-24 (Women's Community Press 1984)." 
